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MARCHETTI, FEDERAL REGISTRATION AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
James Marchetti was convicted in a Federal District Court in
Connecticut for willfully failing to comply with the federal gambler
registration statute.1 The district court also found Marchetti guilty
of a conspiracy to evade payment of a fifty dollar occupational tax im-
posed on all persons engaged in the business of gambling.2 Through-
out the proceedings and after the trial, in an arrest of judgment mo-
tion, Marchetti asserted that the statutory system which required him
to pay the occupational tax violated his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the district court.8
In Marchetti v. United States,4 the Supreme Court held that the
privilege against self-incrimination should have provided a complete
defense to the prosecution of the petitioner. The Supreme Court, in
its grant of certiorari, had limited the issues raised by this case to a
consideration of whether the fifth amendment was a constitutional
bar to the particular provisions of the wager tax statutes.5 In decid-
I Each person required to pay a special tax under this subchapter shall reg-
ister with the official in charge of the internal revenue district-
(1) his name and place of residence;
(2) ... each place of business where the activity which makes him so
liable is carried on, and the name and place of residence of each per-
son who is engaged in receiving wagers for him or on his behalf....
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4412.
2 There shall be imposed a special tax of $50 per year to be paid by each per-
son who is liable for tax under section 4401....
INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 4411. The persons liable for the tax shall pay a 10 percent
excise tax, INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 4401(a), and
Each person who is engaged in the business of accepting wagers shall be
liable for and shall pay the tax ... on all wagers placed with him....
INT. RFv. CODE of 1954, § 4401(c).
3 United States v. Marchetti, 352 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1965). On affirming the convic-
tion, the Court of Appeals relied on the authority of United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22 (1953) and Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
4 390 US. 39 (1968).
5 385 U.S. 1000 (1967):
Do not the federal wagering tax statutes here involved violate the petitioner's
privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment?
Should not this Court, especially in view of its recent decision in Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965), overrule United States
v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), and Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955)?
After argument, the Court requested reargument, 388 U.S. 903 (1967), on the above
question and also on the questions of.
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ing that the privilege was a bar, the Court overruled two cases of long-
standing precedent, United States v. Kahrigerc and Lewis v. United
States.7 These cases had held that the taxing provisions were not vio-
lative of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court in Marchetti held that while the wagering tax provisions
are not unconstitutional, it being well recognized that Congress may
tax illegal activities, those who properly assert the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination may not be criminally punished
for failure to comply with those requirements. 8
In a companion case, Grosso v. United States," the Court fur-
ther developed the position it took in Marchetti. Grosso, who was
tried in a federal district court in Pennsylvania, was found guilty
on fifteen counts of willful failure to pay the ten percent excise tax
imposed on wagers'0 and four counts of willful failure to pay the
occupational tax." Grosso was also convicted on one count of con-
spiracy to defraud the United States Government by not paying the
above taxes. 12 Grosso defended the prosecution by asserting that pay-
ment of the excise tax would require him to incriminate himself.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction 18 and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the same limited issues
that were to be decided in Marchetti.14
Using the Marchetti reasoning, the Court found the act of pay-
ing the excise tax and requirement to pay the occupational tax vio-
lative of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court recog-
nized that there is no statutory mandate that the internal revenue
officers provide state and local prosecutors with lists of those people
(1) What relevance, if any, has the required records doctrine, Shapiro
v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, to the validity under the Fifth Amendment of the
registration and special occupational tax requirements of 26 U.S.C. §§ 4411,
4412?
(2) Can an obligation to pay the special occupational tax required by 26
US.C. § 4411 be satisfied without filing the registration statement provided for
by 26 U.S.C. § 4412?
6 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
7 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
8 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60 (1968).
9 390 U.S. 62 (1968).
10 There shall be imposed on wagers... an excise tax equal to 10 percent of
the amount thereof.
INT. RFv. CODE of 1954, § 4401(a).
11 INT. Ray. CODE Of 1954, § 4411; text set out supra note 2.
12 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
Is United States v. Grosso, 358 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1966).
14 385 U.S. 810 (1966); for a text of the grant of certiorari, see stpra note 5.
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who have paid the excise tax,' 5 but it was also recognized that the
Revenue Service has taken it upon itself to make such lists available.
Because of this situation, the Court felt that there was a genuine
hazard of incrimination, i.e., a real and definite possibility that peo-
ple complying with the statutes would be prosecuted.
It should be noted that Marchetti was convicted for failure to
register as a gambler, and Grosso was convicted for failure to pay
the excise tax. The Court is not saying that the act of paying the
tax is incriminating. It is recognizing that, in order to pay the ten
per cent excise tax, it is necessary that the taxpayer also fill out and
file the appropriate registration forms.' 0 Thus, Grosso is unable to
satisfy his duty to pay the excise tax without also incriminating
himself or increasing his chances of prosecution. He cannot merely
tender the taxes due, he must also file the appropriate registration
forms.
The Court in Grosso, as it did in Marchetti, held that, under
the factual situations presented by these cases, the doctrine of re-
quired records is not applicable.17
In Haynes v. United States,' there is an extension of the ratio-
nale developed in Marchetti and Grosso to a different type of reg-
istration requirement. The petitioner was convicted for violating
a statute which requires that a person may not knowingly own or
possess a firearm which has not been registered with the Secretary
of the Treasury or his delegate as required by the statute1 9 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Haynes' conviction.20
15 There is a statutory mandate to publish a list of all people registering and
paying the fifty dollar occupational tax. Thus, in Mardetti, there was a possibility of
publication if petitioner registered and paid the tax. Ir. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 6107,
requires that a list of special taxpayers be kept for public inspection.
18 This is generally recognized to be the correct procedure; see the arguments
made by the government and the petitioners. See INrr. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 6011.
17 390 U.S. at 56, and 390 U.S. at 67. A definition and discussion of the required
records doctrine will be found in text accompanying notes 59 & 60 infra.
18 390 U.S. 85 (1968).
19 The relevant provisions of the INTERAL zvEEN E CODE OF 1954 are:
§ 5851:
It shall be unlawful for any person to receive . . . or to possess any firearm
which has not been registered as required by section 5841.
§ 5841:
Every person possessing a firearm shall register, with the Secretary or his dele-
gate, the number or other mark identifying such firearm, together with his
name, address, place where such firearm is usually kept, and place of business
or employment.
§ 5848(1):
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Citing Marchetti, the Court in Haynes held that the failure to
register is an offense subject to the defense of the privilege against
self-incrimination. 21 There is, as stated by the Court, a real and ap-
preciable hazard of incrimination in the requirement to register,
because the obligation to register is based entirely upon possession
of specific types of firearms defined by the statute. The specific types
of firearms which must be registered are the types usually used by
people "inherently suspected of criminal activities. ''2 2 The Court
recognized a high correlation between the duty to register and prose-
cutions. The registration requirement works a substantial increase
in the likelihood of prosecution. 23
In declaring that the assertion of the privilege is a valid defense
to a prosecution under the registration acts, the Court, as it did in
Marchetti and Grosso, recognized that Congress has full power to
impose taxes. Congress may even impose taxes on essentially illegal
activities. It is understood that the principal interest of the United
States is the collection of revenue and not the prosecution of the
people committing the illegal activity.24 These statements by the
Court constitute a recognition that (1) the statutes are valid reve-
nue measures and (2) that deference must be given to the Congres-
sional power to tax; but there is also the recognition that the Court
is obligated to heed the limitations placed on that power by other
provisions of the Constitution.
The term "firearm" means a shotgun having a barrel or barrels of less than
18 inches in length, or a rifle having a barrel or barrels of less than 16 inches
in length, or any weapon made from a rifle or shotgun .. . if such weapon
as modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches, or any other weapon,
except a pistol or revolver, from which a shot is discharged by an explosive
if such weapon is capable of being concealed on the person, or a machine gun,
and includes a muffler or silencer for any firearm whether or not such firearm
is included within the foregoing definition.
20 Haynes v. United States, 872 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1967).
21 The Court felt that a prosecution under § 5851 was not properly distinguishable
from a prosecution under § 5841. The government had claimed that these were two
entirely distinct offenses: § 5851 was intended to punish acceptance of a firearm which
was never registered pursuant to the requirements of § 5841; and, § 5841 was Intended
to punish the possessor who fails to register the fact of his own possession. In spite of
the government's argument, the Court felt that a conviction under § 5851 is not
properly distinguishable from a conviction under § 5841. Haynes v. United States,
890 US. 85, 93-95 (1968).
22 Id. at 96.
23 Id. at 97.
24 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 89, 44 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 890
U.S. 62, 68 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 890 U.S. 85, 90 (1968).
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In all these cases, Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, there is a re-
jection of a government proposal that if the statutes are violative
of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, the Court
should impose some form of use-restriction (an immunity from prose-
cution) rather than declare the statute unconstitutional. 25 The gov-
ernment contended that unless the "use-restriction" is imposed, the
statutes would be of little value. It was the government's contention
that it makes no sense to say that Congress has the power to tax the
illegal activity but does not have the power to require essential in-
formation for purposes of record-keeping and enforcement of the tax.
The government felt that it was important that certain essential in-
formation be provided, but that the Court could restrict the use of
that information in any federal, state or local prosecution for sim-
ilar offenses. The government proposed that the use-restriction be
patterned after that found in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,6-
and that such imposition would not constitute a judicial legislation
of an immunty statute, but rather a restriction on use.27 The Court
rejected this proposal on the theory that granting immunity is a Con-
gressional function and not one properly belonging to the Court.
It has only been in recent years that the Court has begun to
define the areas in which the privilege against self-incrimination will
apply. The language of the fifth amendment would suggest that
it ought to be applied only in criminal cases; however, its history
indicates that it is not to be interpreted literally.- The privilege
against self-incrimination has been called "one of the great land-
marks in man's struggle to make himself civilized." 30 In a spirit
of an expansive view of the fifth amendment, the Court in recent
years has defined a diversity of activities to which the privilege
against self-incrimination will apply. The privilege has been con-
strued to protect the criminally accused from the time the criminal
25 Marchetti v. United States, 890 U.S. 39, 58-60 (1968); Grosso v. United States.
390 U.S. 62, 69 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1968).
26 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
27 Brief for the United States on Reargument at 33, Marchctti v. United States,
390 U.S. 89 (1968) and Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Brief for United States]; and Brief for the United States at 31, Haynes v. United States,
890 U.S. 85 (1968).
28 U.S. CONsr. amend. V: "No person... shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself.. :'
29 McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. Cr. Rrv. 193, 194
[hereinafter cited as McKay].
30 E. GRSwoLD, Tim Fwrn' A3, mEN-,r ToDAY 7 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
GRmvoLD].
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process begins to "focus on a particular suspect"' 1 or his freedom
of movement is impaired. 2 The privilege also requires that, before
custodial interrogation may begin, the criminally accused must be
informed of his right to counsel, his right to remain silent, and that
anything he says may be used against him. 8 'It has also been held
a violation of the privilege if the defendant fails to take the witness
stand in a criminal prosecution and the prosecutor is allowed to
comment on that fact.34
Besides application of the privilege to criminal cases, it is gen-
erally recognized that the privilege applies in all civil cases where
the result of the testimony may be incrimination. 85 Today there is a
general recognition that the privilege will apply to testimony to be
given before an administrative agency,8 legislative committee, 7 or a
grand jury.38
In Malloy v. Hogan"9 the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits state infringement on the privilege against
self-incrimination. Thus, the privilege is applicable to the states,
and in some recent decisions the Court has found it appropriate
to further expand the scope of the privilege by holding: (1) that the
privilege applies to situations where the giving of testimony in one
jurisdiction under a grant of immunity from prosecution will none-
theless subject the witness to possible prosecution in another juris-
diction; 40 (2) that the privilege will be a bar to the compulsion of
testimony in any factual situation where some form of sanction
makes "costly" the non-exercise of the privilege.41
As the definition of the scope of the privilege has expanded in
modern times, the privilege has come into conflict with legitimate
government need to acquire and use information to regulate and
govern effectively.42 There has been much discussion, with regard
81 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
82 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83 Id. at 479.
84 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
85 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).
6 ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
37 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
88 Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507 (1960).
39 878 U.S. 1 (1964).
40 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 878 U.S. 52 (1964).
41 Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 498 (1967);
Griffin v. California, 880 U.S. 609 (1965); and the cases that are the subject of this note.
42 Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incriminalion, 65
COLum. L. Ray. 681, 682 (1965). See also Brief for United States.
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to the Escobedo and Miranda cases, concerning the Court's view
that in an in-custody situation the values that the fifth amendment
was designed to protect must be upheld above all else, i.e., above
the government's need to obtain evidence to convict the accused.
In Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes the Court is grappling with the
same type of problems that it had to decide in the cases relating to
the criminal process. The Court must consider on the one hand the
government's need for information, and, on the other, the hazards
of incrimination that the registration statutes pose and the values
of the fifth amendment that the privilege is designed to protect.
Thus a relevant inquiry may be: what do these cases do to past
precedent, the present view of the privilege and the possible future
course that the Court will take when dealing with fifth amendment
problems? Inasmuch as the Court's opinions in Grosso and Haynes
are primarily a reiteration of the position it takes in Marchetti, and
because those cases rely on Marchetti as precedent, the attempt to
answer the questions suggested above will be primarily from the
effect that the Marchetti decision has on precedent and the present
view of the fifth amendment, and the effect it is likely to have on
the scope of the privilege.
As noted above, the Marchetti decision overrules two strong
precedents: United States v. Kahrigers and Lewis v. United States."
Those cases were almost identical to the factual situation presented
by Marchetti. In Kahriger and Lewis, the petitioners made the same
fifth amendment self-incrimination claim and in those cases the
Court rejected that claim. In Kahriger the Court said that the wager
tax statutes and the requirement of registration did not present any
form of compulsion to the potential registrant. The registrant is not
compelled to confess acts already committed; the statute merely sets
down particular conditions that must be fulfilled in order to engage
in the business. 45 The Kahriger Court argued that the privilege ap-
plies only to past acts and is not applicable to future acts which may
or may not be committed.46 In Lewis the Court could find no com-
pulsion in the tax provisions47 and went on to say that the statute
merely designates a class of people that are liable for the tax if they
decide to engage in the activity that is being taxed. The fact that
one wishes to engage in the activity which is illegal is his decision.
43 45 US. 22 (1953).
44 348 US. 419 (1955).
45 845 US. at 82-33.
46 Id. at 32.
47 348 US. at 421.
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He is free to do so, but it must be recognized that there is no con-
stitutional right to gamble. 48 The Court was certainly aware of the
dilemma in which these decisions placed the gambler 4O-he was
damned if he registered and damned if he did not-but it felt that
the values of the privilege were outweighed by the competing need
for information necessary to enforce the tax provisions.
In Marchetti the issue was put in its proper perspective: 'the
question is not whether petitioner holds a 'right' to violate state
law, but whether, having done so, he may be compelled to give evi-
dence against himself." 50 The Court recognized that the privilege
protects the guilty as well as the innocent and that there can be no
waiver of the privilege by failure to assert it at the time the decision
is made on whether or not to register and pay the tax. 1 The Court
in Marchetti says that the Kahriger and Lewis decisions represent
"too narrow" a view of the privilege. Those decisions failed to ac-
count for the hazards of incrimination as to past or present acts, in
that by registering one is increasing the likelihood of prosecution.
This is especially true in Grosso; as pointed out above, in order to
pay the tax, the petitioner would also be required to fill out and
file the appropriate registration forms. The very fact that the peti-
tioner is paying the excise tax would mean that he has, sometime
prior to the tender of the tax money, gambled. Thus, there is def-
initely incrimination as to past acts in the Grosso situation. 2 Beyond
this consideration, however, the Court felt that "past-present act
doctrine" is in itself "too narrow." The Court sees real and sub-
stantial hazards of incrimination in the requirement to register. The
increase in the possibility of prosecution is the hazard that the Court
sees.
There is no denying that there is a definite need for effective
methods of law enforcement to guard against social ills. The fact
that all states have some form of statute prohibiting or regulating
gambling is indicative of our society's feelings that gambling is not
a desirable form of conduct.83 The tax laws are one method of
bringing about effective controls and effective law enforcement. Tax
laws, like those in question in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, are
48 Id. at 422-23.
49 Kahriger v. United States, 345 U.S. 22, 36-37 (1953) (Black, J. dissenting opinion),
50 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 51 (1968).
51 Id.
52 McKay 221-22.
583 A list of state gambling statutes may be found in Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 44 n.5 (1968).
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a source of information which may be used to check undesirable
types of conduct. Besides the check on criminal activity, the infor-
mation obtained through these statutes may also be used to initiate
general probes, harass the registrant, and subject him to exposure
and publicity of his criminal conduct.54 Because the registration re-
quirements can be used to enforce criminal statutes and regulate
criminal conduct, there is some doubt that the statutes may properly
be called "good faith revenue measures" as the Court does in Mar-
chetti, Grosso, and Haynes. The purpose of the statute is further
thrown in doubt by the fact that it is generally recognized that there
is a high enforcement cost for a low yield of revenue.5 5 If the taxes
are not valid revenue measures,55 if the primary purpose of the
statutes is the regulation of conduct, then the Court should have
had an easier time deciding the issues raised by Marchetti, Grosso,
and Haynes.
The Court complicated its problem by assuming that the taxes
were valid revenue measures and that implicit in the revenue pur-
pose of the enactments is the gathering of information which the
taxpayer is required to file. Because of this recognition of the statutes
as revenue measures, the Court was presented with the government's
contention that because there is a valid tax purpose, a balance must
be struck between that tax purpose and the fifth amendment priv-
ilege. It was the government's belief that Kahriger and Lewis strike
a proper balance between the privilege and the power to tax and
represent and reflect an accommodation of the competing values. 57
By holding the privilege applicable to the situation, the Court
is moving away from and rejecting the accommodation approach of
Kahriger and Lewis. The Court, in Marchetti, is saying that in these
situations the scope of the privilege is such that certain values cannot
be compromised, accommodated or balanced against Congress' power
to tax, the need for information or the social necessity for devices to
control crime. The fact that the Court overrules Kahriger and Lewis
in the face of the government's suggestion that those cases represent
54 Comment, Self-Incrimination and Registration Statutes: A Case Against Con-
stitutionality, 4 HousroN L. Rxv. 507, 521 (1966).
55 In Brief for United States, n.17, it is stated that since the enactment of the
wagering tax in 1952 until this action in 1966, the total revenue has been approxi-
mately 106 million dollars, while the enforcement cost for the same period has been
approximately 27 million. See also McKay 222-23.
56 Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Kahriger v. United States, 345 US.
22, 37-40 (1953), suggests that they are not.
57 Brief for United States 23-24.
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an appropriate accommodation of the privilege values, coupled with
the fact that the Court in so doing says that Kahriger and Lewis rep-
resent "too narrow" a view of the scope of the privilege, suggests
that it is adopting a more expansive view of the fifth amendment
privilege, a view that certain values of the privilege must be put
above all other competing values.
I Further proof that the Court has moved away from the accom-
modation notion is reflected in the peculiar part of the opinion
where the Court recognizes the statute as a revenue measure. If the
purpose of an enactment is something other than the detection and
prosecution of crime, the statute is easier to sustain.68 Valid revenue
measures are usually struck down or watered down only when there
are strong overriding of competing values. In Marchetti there is no
discussion of competing values, only a flat statement that the asser-
tion of the privilege is a valid defense. The decision is framed in
such a way that the statute is on the books, but the privilege may be
properly asserted in any prosecution to enforce the requirements
of registration or the payment of the taxes. Thus, the Court has only
nominally accommodated the competing values. In actuality there
has been a complete emasculation of the statute's effectiveness. It
cannot be said that the statutes have any effectiveness in providing
information or a means to control criminal activity.
The Court discussed a second form of constitutional accom-
modation: the required records doctrine as enunciated in Shapiro
v. United States.59 The petitioner in Shapiro claimed that the statute
that allowed the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum to require him
to produce certain business records, which led to his conviction for
violation of the Emergency Price Control Act, violated his consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination. The Court held that
if private papers are made matters of public record and subject to
government inspection by Congressional enactment, then produc-
tion of the papers is not a violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination. The rationale for the decision in Shapiro, as in
Kahriger and Lewis, is a recognition that the government has a
definite need for information so that it may effectively enforce the
regulations that Congress enacts.6
58 Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sip. CT. Rzv. 103, 146
[hereinafter cited as Mansfield].
59 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
6o This fact is pointed out to the Court in Brief for United States 7. See also
McKay 217.
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The decision in Shapiro has allowed Congress to bypass the
privilege in every transactional situation that Congress may deem
it appropriate to regulate. Fortunately, agency administrators and
Congress have not pushed the doctrine to its logical limit.6e
In its grant of certiorari in Marchetti, the Court indicated its
willingness to re-consider and re-evaluate its position on the doctrine
and to consider how the doctrine might affect the problems raised
in the case. 62 When the court reaches the issue of required records
in Marchetti, it side-steps the problem by saying that the three es-
sential elements of the doctrine, as described by Shapiro, are not
present in the case: (1) Marchetti is not obliged to keep records of
the type he has customarily kept, (2) there are no public aspects to
the records, and (3) unlike the Shapiro situation, this is an area that
is "permeated with criminal statutes." s
It would seem that there are three possible reasons why the
Court side-stepped the issue of required records in Marchetti. First,
the Court was exercising a judicial restraint that is similar to the
restraint exercised by the doctrine in Shapiro. But here the Court
has more reason to exercise restraint because this is an area per-
meated with criminal statutes and sanctions. The Court is taking
a position similar to that of Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in
Shapiro:64 in order to determine whether the records are public one
must take into account their custody, subject matter and the use to
be made of them. The Court recognizes the statutes as valid taxes
but also point out that the information can be used to prosecute
the registrant for criminal acts. Second, the petitioner and the gov-
ernment suggested to the Court that the doctrine is not applicable.
This certainly must have influenced the Court's decision. Third,
although the government suggested that the required records doc-
trine was not applicable, it also pointed out that in an appropriate
case there must be some form of accommodation between the gov-
ernment's need for information and the scope of the privilege. The
required records doctrine can provide such accommodation. If these
statutes are truly a valid exercise of the taxing power and if there
is a definite need for information for the enforcement of the statutes,
then why would not the Court attempt to squeeze the case into this
justification for allowing disclosure in the face of possible incrim-
61 McKay 215.
62 See note 5 supra setting out the Court's grant of certiorari.
63 Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 47 (1968).
64 335 U.S. at 56.
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ination? The Court could easily twist the facts to meet the essential
elements of the required records doctrine. By distinguishing Shapiro
on factual grounds, the Court misses an excellent opportunity to
uphold and justify the registration requirement and to follow prece-
dent. Because the Court refused to follow Shapiro, and to the extent
that the case represents another form of constitutional accommoda-
tion, the Court rejects the accommodation approach and finds cer-
tain fifth amendment values above accommodation and compromise.
If the statutes were found to violate the privilege against self-
incrimination, the government argued in Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes, instead of holding the registration provisions unconstitu-
tional, the Court should adopt a use-restriction rule:
. . the proper remedy would be to limit the use of the infor-
mation obtained from registration and the filing of an excise
tax return to federal tax purposes.
. . . where there is a clear governmental interest in the infor-
mation sought, where only a minimal or limited disclosure is
required and where the interest in obtaining the information
is grounded on a legitimate exercise of a separate and indepen-
dent governmental power, and not principally a concern with
the underlying activity involved, a persuasive case can be
made for applying a use-restriction rule like that adopted in
Murphy.65. 66
It was the government's contention that such a rule would allow
the Court to preserve the taxing power and at the same time retain
the essential protection of the privilege. 7 The Government argued
that it was not asking the Court to usurp the function of Congress
and, in effect, adopt an immunity statute. The government was ask-
ing the Court to adopt a rule that where there is a criminal prose-
cution of a registrant, who has complied with all of the registration
requirements, the prosecutor will have to show that the evidence
is not tainted by the required disclosure and that the evidence which
was the basis of the probable cause to arrest and prosecute the regis-
trant was the product of an independent source. 8
The general rule is that a grant of immunity from prosecution
must be as broad as the protection afforded by the privilege against
self-incrimination. 69 Assuming that not all prosecution is prohibited
65 Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 878 U.S. 52 (1964).
86 Brief for United States 26-28.
67 Id. at 28-29.
68 Id. at 33.
69 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892); see also Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 48 (1906); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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by a use-restriction rule or a grant of immunity,70 it is difficult to
see why the Court rejected the use-restriction proposal. When a use-
restriction rule is adopted and prosecution is allowed, the Court
will be able to protect the individual by limiting the use of the
tainted evidence and requiring the prosecution to prove the evi-
dence is not tainted and is derived from some independent source.
All grants of immunity or restriction on use present judicially ad-
ministratable situations in which the Court can determine whether
the protections of the privilege are being extended.
A use-restriction or a grant of immunity is an effective method
of accommodating constitutional values. The Court, in rejecting the
proposed use-restriction, finds an easy way out in the argument that
granting immunity is a Congressional function and solely within
Congress' power.
It would seem that the Court's rationale in rejecting the use-
restriction proposal may be criticized in three respects. First, as has
been pointed out above, the Court's position was that the statutes
in question were valid revenue measures. If that is true, then the
Court should attempt to uphold those measures if at all possible.
By failing to use an accepted accommodation method, i.e., a use-
restriction, the Court is not attempting to uphold the statute as
valid exercises of the Congressional power to tax. Secondly, the gov-
ernment did not propose the enactment of an immunity statute; the
proposal was for a judicially declared use-restriction in the same
way the Court declared a use-restriction in Murphy. If nothing else,
this distinction gave the Court a possible ground for circumventing
the objection that such a procedure by the Court would constitute
a usurpation of Congressional power. Third, as Mr. Chief Justice
Warren points out in his dissent, what seems to be troubling the
Court is not the fact that there is a registration requirement, but
that the information obtained must be turned over to prosecuting
authorities.71 Chief Justice Warren also points out that Congress
70 There certainly is substantial reason to suggest that an immunity or use-re-
striction does not impose a total prohibition on prosecution. Murphy leaves the ques-
tion up in the air, but Justice White in his concurring opinion in Murphy, 378 U.S.
at 107, suggests that the Constitution does not go so far as to require that immunity
protect against all prosecutions. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), holds
that the privilege "prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of state-
ments obtained under threat of removal from office," id. at 500, with no further sug-
gestion that all prosecution is prohibited. Thus, it may be assumed that the grant of
immunity or a use-restriction does not prohibit all subsequent prosecution.
71 In the principal internal revenue office . .. there shall be kept, for public
inspection, an alphabetical list of the names of all persons who have paid
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intended that any provision that the Court would deem inconsti-
tutional is separable under a separability clause in the Internal
Revenue Code.7 2 Thus, the argument could be made that it is the
operation of section 6107 and the requirement of disclosure of the
names and addresses of the registrants that is violative of the priv-
ilege and should be severed from the code. Again, however, the
Court does not take this approach; rather, it finds that the mere
fact of registration is a violation of the privilege.
Thus, the decision in Marchetti to overrule Kahriger and Lewis,
to distinguish Shapiro and to reject the government proposal for a
judicially imposed use-restriction, constitutes the rejection of three
acceptable methods of accommodating competing values. In reject-
ing the accommodation methods, the Court in Marchetti, Grosso,
and Haynes holds that there are certain fifth amendment values that
are primary and cannot be accommodated. In order to determine
what these decisions may mean, one must first attempt to find the
basic values the privilege is designed to protect. Having done this,
it then becomes proper to ask whether there are certain fifth amend-
ment values that can never be accommodated.
Wigmore suggests twelve reasons or values that are the basis
for the privilege. 3 He dismisses ten of the values as not totally rele-
vant in all cases, and concludes:
The significant purposes of the privilege ... are two: The first
is to remove the right to an answer in the hard cores of instances
where compulsion might lead to inhumanity, the principal in-
humanity being abusive tactics by a zealous questioner. The
second is to comply with the prevailing ethic that the individual
is sovereign and that proper rules of battle between government
and individual require that the individual not be bothered for
less than good reason and not be conscripted by his opponent
to defeat himself. 4
Another source suggests three bases for the privilege: (1) abhorrence
of torture and brutality, (2) preventing political and religious op-
pression and thought control, and (3) protection of the policy of
special taxes. . . .Such lists ...shall contain the time, place, and business
for which such special taxes have been paid, and upon application of any
prosecuting officer of any State, county, or municipality there shall be fur-
nished to him a certified copy thereof....
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 6107.
72 INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 7852(a).
"13 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2251, at 310-17 (McNaghton rev. 1961).
14 Id.
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preventing general probes and protection of personal privacy. 5
Griswold has expressed the values which the privilege protects as
a combination of our abhorrence of torture and a recognition of
the dignity of the individual. He suggests that the fifth amendment
is a symbol of the community's moral sense of justice.76 One recent
writer has suggested that all of the rationales traditionally given as
a basis of the privilege are either doubtful or unbelievable and that
there are only two basic values that the privilege protects: First, the
integrity of the judicial system, by requiring the government to
bear the burden of proof, even when prosecuting the guilty; and
second, the privacy of the individual.77
It is not within the scope of this note to discuss the rightness
or wrongness of any of these statements. There can only be a lim-
ited reconciliation of all of the diverse statements on what values
the privilege is designed to protect. Underlying all of the values
suggested, there seems to be an abhorrence of brutality and violence,
a feeling that "fairness" requires imposition of the privilege, and,
as suggested by some writers, a concern for the privacy of the in-
dividual and freedom from governmental intrusion.
Assuming that the above represents a fair synopsis of the under-
lying values the fifth amendment protects, then the question can
again be asked: what is the meaning of the decision in Marchetti
to reject all of the accommodation approaches to the problem? The
privilege against self-incrimination has been viewed as something
less than an absolute right; and one of the traditional methods used
by the Court to deal with fifth amendment problems is the accom-
modation of competing values. How could it be said that there is
an absolute right in the privilege when historically the privilege
has not been viewed as an absolute right and the usual constitu-
tional approach to fifth amendment problems has been through
some form of accommodation?
In deciding Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes, the Court places
strong emphasis on Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Board,78 which held that a statute which required all members of
75 See Comment, supra note 54 at 518-19. The article presents a good synopsis of
the history of the privilege and a discussion of the values that the privilege has
been thought to protect.
76 Gxuswor.D 53.
77 McKay 206-14.
78 382 U.S. 70 (1965). This emphasis can be seen in the Court's grant of certiorari,
see supra note 5, and the frequent citation of the case in the opinion.
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the Communist party to register violated the petitioner's privilege
against self-incrimination. There are certainly factual differences
between Albertson and Marchetti,0 but assuming that the cases are
sufficiently similar, the primary inquiry is what does the Court do
in Albertson that is relevant to the decision in Marchetti? In Al-
bertson the Court distinguished United States v. Sullivan,80 a case
which upheld the requirement that all people fill out and file an
income tax return. The Albertson Court reasoned that:
In Sullivan the questions in the income tax return were neutral
on their face and directed at the public at large, but here they
are directed at a highly selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities.81
The Marchetti decision adopts this distinction and says that requir-
ing registration by a gambler places the inquiry in an area perme-
ated with criminal statutes. It might also be noted that Albertson,
to some extent, is the case that first expresses the view against ap-
poaching fifth amendment problems by the accommodation method.
There are certainly strong competing values in Albertson-national
security and the need for information-but when the Court strikes
down the statute requiring registration, there is no discussion of
competing values.8 s The Court merely says that the statute violates
the privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court's attitude in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes may
have come also from the approach that it took in Garrity v. New
Jersey83 and Spevack v. Klein.84 These cases hold that "if it is costly"
or one must "suffer penalty" to assert the privilege, there is no free
choice to speak out or remain silent. The Court approached the
problem in those cases by saying that regardless of the competing
values, if the assertion of the privilege is "costly" it is a form of
79 Mansfield 157-58, suggests two relevant factual differences. First, after register-
ing in the Marchetti situation, the registrant can still decide whcther to gamble or
not; in the Communist registration requirement the obligation to register is Imposed
without regard to whether some future activity is engaged in. Second, it may be
easier to find a valid purpose in the Albertson registration situation than in the wager-
ing tax cases. On the other hand, the Albertson situation has first amendment colora-
tion (suppression of political action and opinion) which strengthens the argument
based on the fifth amendment.
80 274 US. 259 (1927).
81 Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 582 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
82 Not only is there no discussion of competing values, but the Court does not
even attempt to distinguish or discuss Kahriger, Lewis, or Shapiro.
83 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
84 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
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compulsion that is forbidden by the fifth amendment. Again there
is no discussion of competing values.
In Albertson, Garrity, Spevack, and Marchetti the Court is not
attempting to express abhorrence of violence or torture. There is
not in any of the factual situations presented by these cases any
form of violence, torture or physical contact. Thus, the first sug-
gested value that the privilege is designed to protect may be ruled
out in these cases as a basis for the opinions.
To some extent the Court is attempting to uphold the "fair-
ness" value in these cases. This value must necessarily be a major
consideration in the Court's decisions. It is not "fair" to force any
suspect to incriminate himself or put him in a position that a dis-
closure may result in a subsequent prosecution. The ironic part of
the Marchetti decision is that if "fairness" is the value that the Court
views the privilege as designed to protect, then why does the Court
reject the accommodation methods? The traditional method of de-
termining what is "fair" is by asking the question "considering all
of the circumstances, is it fair to require the accused to speak?' s5
Yet the Court does not adopt this line of reasoning in the Marchetti
case. Thus, it is arguable that "fairness," in the view of the Court,
was not the primary value protected by the fifth amendment.
Since the abhorrence of violence and torture has been ruled
out as a value, and assuming that rejection of the accommodation
approach in Marchetti is to be understood as a rejection of the "fair-
ness" value as the basis of the privilege, then it might be properly
argued that what the Court is concerned with in Marchetti, Grosso,
and Haynes, and to some extent in Garrity, Spevack, and Albertson,
is the right of the individual to privacy, to be free from general
probings and governmental intrusions. This analysis is relevant be-
cause the value that we fix as the basis of the privilege will give
different results. As an example, assume that the Court is correct in
stating that the formulation of a use-restriction is a Congressional
function. Because of the holdings in Marchetti, Grosso, and Haynes,
it is fairly certain that Congress, in order to give the statutory sys-
tem some effectiveness, will impose some form of immunity or use-
restriction. 6 Assuming that Congress has already acted in granting
85 The cases in this area are too numerous to mention; generally, it wvould be
appropriate to see the Due Process balancing cases and the coerced confession cases
such as Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) and Schmerber v. California, 384
US. 757 (1966).
S6 Brief for United States 33-34, states that the Internal Revenue Service has at-
ready acted to get some form of Treasury ruling or Congressional amendment of
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immunity, the same problems arise: what are the fifth amendment
values? If we assume that a grant of immunity must be as broad as
the privilege that it displaces, 87 then the problem becomes one of
determining the breadth of the privilege. If we say that the basis
of the privilege is fairness and if we accept the proposition that one
of the traditional methods of determining what is fair is by an ac-
commodation of competing values, then the Congressional grant of
immunity presents no problem. The grant of immunity is an accom.
modation of competing values and all acceptable accommodation
methods may be used to insure fairness. Thus, the grant of immunity
is as broad as the privilege that it displaces. However, if it is said
that the privilege is based on a value of privacy, then a grant of
immunity is not as broad as the privilege that it displaces because
any disclosure, even where there is immunization from prosecution,
is an invasion of privacy.88 If the value of the privilege is privacy,
then a grant of immunity by its very nature is not as broad as the
privilege it displaces because disclosure is required under a grant
of immunity and disclosure is an invasion of privacy.
The decision in Marchetti will probably have two effects in the
area of fifth amendment problems. First, because Congress has en-
acted many statutes which have registration requirements similar
to the one the Court finds subject to the defense of the privilege, 89
there is no question that the Marchetti decision will be a strong
precedent for striking down similar registration requirements.90 The
process has already begun in Haynes.
Second, it is highly probable that there will be a Congressional
response to the Marchetti decision. It is likely that Congress will
enact some form of immunity provision or amend the provision
§ 6107 to exclude gambling occupational taxes from the list of taxes subject to public
disclosure.
87 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 US. 547 (1891).
88 An example of this proposition would be the hypothetical situation where
Mr. X, a noted university professor in the field of economics, is required to register
because he is a communist. Mr. X may be granted an immunity from prosecution,
but what has been done to his reputation in the academic community? By requiring
disclosure there has been such an invasion of his privacy that a grant of Immunity
will not protect that privacy.
89 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1964) requires that narcotic addicts who leave or enter
the United States register.
90 N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1968, at 25, col. 3: "Justice Department lawyers con.
curred today with his [Chief Justice Warren in dissent] prediction that similar con.
stitutional attacks would be made immediately against Federal laws which require
ptrsons to register if they deal in narcotics, marijuana or liquor distillery equipment."
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that requires disclosure of the registrant's name.01 Because the ac-
commodation approach was rejected .in Marchetti, such legislation
would place the Court in a rather delicate position. If the Court
rejected the use-restriction proposed by the Government because
it felt that the value to be protected is privacy, then, as pointed out
above, it cannot, consistently with that value, uphold the grant of
immunity as co-extensive with the privilege. On the other hand, if
the value is fairness and the Court recognizes that a Congressional
grant of immunity is an appropriate method to guarantee fair-
ness, it would be reasonable to ask why the Court did not accept
the accommodation approach in the cases that prompted the Con-
gressional action.
If the privacy value is found to be the basis of the privilege,
the Court has broadened the scope of the privilege. If this is the
situation, then there is emerging something approaching an absolute
right in the privilege against self-incrimination, a right that cannot
be compromised in the face of competing values. What the Court
must do, and what it has failed to do in Marchetti, Grosso, and
Haynes, is to give a definition of that value which is at the base of
the privilege. These cases do not define that value, but they point
in the direction of finding in the fifth amendment protection of the
individual's privacy.
Jack R. Pigman
91 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 6107.
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